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Abstract 
We analyse the impact of Fair Trade and organic farming on a sample of Fair Trade rice producers in 
Thailand.  We find that per capita income from agriculture is positively and significantly affected by 
organic certification and FT affiliation years. This effect does not translate into higher productivity due 
to a concurring increase in worked hours. The estimated FT and organic certification contributions are 
however downward biased if we do not take into account the relatively higher share of self-
consumption of affiliated farmers. Our main findings are robust when we control for selection bias and 
endogeneity with instrumental variables, when using propensity score matching and restricting the 
sample to affiliated producers only. We also test which of the two (organic and FT) effects is stronger 
and find that the latter prevails.  
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Fair Trade is an increasingly fashionable economic phenomenon aimed to promote inclusion of 
marginalised farmers with a package of economic initiatives which include improved market access, 
capacity building, environmental sustainability, export services, price stabilisation and provision of a 
premium which is used for investment or development of local public goods.
1 
Fair Trade is gradually mainstreaming after having been a niche phenomenon for several years. 
Between 2006 and 2007, total FT sales registered a 127% increase by volume and 72% by estimated 
retail value. Growth in Europe has averaged 50 % per year in the last 6 years. Even though Fair Trade 
has been originated by not for profit importers (called Alternative Trade Organisations or ATOs), the 
growing consensus of consumers willing to pay for the social and environmental value incorporated in 
the products has induced traditional corporations to step in. Cooperative supermarkets in the UK and 
Italy created their own Fair Trade product lines since the ‘90es, Nestlè launched its first fair-trade 
product in 2005. Tesco and Sainsbury announced their decision to sell 100% Fair Trade bananas 
boosting up the UK market share for this product to 25 percent in 2008.
2 On September the 3
rd 2008 
Ebay launched a dedicated platform (WorldOfGood.com) for Fair Trade e-commerce calculating that 
the U.S. market for such goods was $209 billion in 2005, and forecasting the rise to $420 billion in 
2010.  
                                                 
1   According to IFAT (the main international organisation gathering producers and Fair Trade organizations) such 
criteria are: i) Creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers; ii) Transparency and accountability; iii) 
Capacity building; iv) Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of a fair price; vi) Gender Equity; vii) Working conditions 
(healthy working environment for producers. The participation of children, if any, does not adversely affect their well-
being, security, educational requirements and need for play and conforms to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
as well as the law and norms in the local context); viii) The environment; ix) Trade Relations (Fair Trade Organizations 
trade with concern for the social, economic and environmental well-being of marginalized small producers and do not 
maximise profit at their expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect that 
contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. Whenever possible, producers are assisted with access to pre-harvest 
or pre-production advance payment). 
2   For a discussion on competition between fair trade dedicated retailers and supermarkets see also Kohler (2007).  3    
The theoretical literature on FT is expanding in these last years but it finds generally difficult to capture 
with a single model the variety and multiplicity of FT characteristics.
3  
From a theoretical point of view one of the most controversial issues is the price premium paid to local 
producers, traditionally seen as a distortion of the market clearing price which risks to send wrong 
signals leading to excess supply. Some authors however emphasize that the premium is justifiable in 
presence of monopsonistic markets, or that it may be conceived as a successful innovation in a 
competitive environment with rational consumers, in presence of  a moral hazard problem on 
producer’s  investment (Reinstein and Song, 2008). 
Yet, it is more correct to evaluate Fair Trade in dynamic than in static terms. In this perspective the 
potential development of a given country or area crucially depends, among other factors, on the 
opportunities that individuals have to develop their talents. With this respect, promotion of equal 
opportunities and creation of economic value may go hand in hand if the former eases access to 
education, credit and markets. This is what FT declares to do when emphasizing capacity building and 
creation of opportunities for disadvantaged producers among its principles. 
 A Fair Trade product is therefore a bundle of a physical product plus an intangible social and/or 
environmental content. The latter is a fundamental component but it is not unfortunately an experience 
good (we do not learn more about the effectiveness of the social and environmental action of Fair 
Trade by buying more of the product). This is why impact studies in this field are urgently needed.  
With this respect, the current literature of FT studies presents some valuable case studies (Bacon, 2005; 
Pariente, 2000; Castro, 2001a and b; Nelson and Galvez, 2000; Ronchi, 2002) and a few econometric 
analyses which evaluate the impact of affiliation against the benchmark of a control group of non FT 
producers living in the same areas.
4 Among the latter Ronchi (2006) finds on a panel of 157 mill data 
                                                 
3   Valuable contributions to it are those of Maseland and De Vaal (2002), Moore (2004), Hayes (2004) and Redfern 
and Sneker (2002). 
4   For a comparative view of such studies see Rueben (2008).  4    
that FT helped affiliated Costa Rican coffee producers to increase their market power. Other empirical 
studies on producers’ organisations in Kenya, Chile and Peru (Becchetti and Costantino, 2008; 
Becchetti et al. 2007) show that FT significantly affects child schooling by increasing household 
income and productivity, but only when household income overcomes a minimal threshold consistently 
with the “luxury axiom” hypothesis (Basu and Van 1998).  
In all cases the stereotype of an exclusive relationship between affiliated producers and the Fair Trade 
channel is rejected in favour of a more articulated pattern of relationships. In this respect, Fair Trade is 
potentially an opportunity to improve access to market, reduce vulnerability to shocks and diversify 
trade channels for producers who often depend on monopolistic transportation intermediaries and who 
however keep on selling part of their production to them and on the local market. 
The above summarized theoretical and empirical FT literature suggests that the crucial hypothesis to be 
tested is the following: does Fair Trade promote capacity building and inclusion of farmers in 
international markets, as it promises in its principles which play a strong role in motivating consumer 
purchases (Becchetti et al., 2007)?  
We test this hypothesis by evaluating whether affiliation years enhances economic value and, in doing 
so, we introduce some important novelties in this literature. First, from a methodological point of view, 
we cannot perform a randomized experiment since Fair Trade affiliation comes before we decided to 
start our research. We therefore need to control carefully for endogeneity and potential selection bias. 
To do so we propose three main alternatives: an instrumental variable approach, a propensity score 
evaluation and the restriction of our analysis to the treatment sample only to eliminate any potential 
heterogeneity between treatment and control samples. Second, we test separately the organic 
certification and FT affiliation effects which are often combined and observationally equivalent in 
many FT projects. We do so by exploiting the relatively shorter FT affiliation spell with respect to the 
organic certification period. In this respect we provide also a contribution to  the literature on the  5    
relationship between organic farming and productivity which presents contributions with mixed results, 
even though the majority of them document a negative relationship.
5 By limiting our focus to 
productivity our analysis neglects the wider issue of the impact of organic farming on environmental 
sustainability and therefore has not the ambition to perform an overall cost/benefit evaluation of 
organic farming. 
The paper is divided into five sections (including introduction and conclusions).  In the second section 
we describe the characteristics of the Green Net Cooperative of Thai organic rice producers which is 
the object of our scrutiny, in the third we describe our dataset, in the fourth and fifth sections we 
illustrate and comment our descriptive and econometric findings. The final section concludes.  
 
2. The FT Project in Thailand 
 
Green Net Cooperative
6 is a major organic fair trade producer in Thailand. It was established in 1993 
by a group of producers and consumers with the aim of supporting environmentally and socially 
responsible business. In 2002 it received the Fair Trade label by the Fair Trade Labelling Organization 
(FLO).   
                                                 
5   Offerman and Nieberg (2000) compare the economic performance of organic and conventional farms in different 
countries and find that organic farms have lower yields, higher output prices and slightly lower unit costs. Ricci, Maccarini 
and Zanoli (2004) find that part of the reduced efficiency of organic farming is due to the difficulties and length of the 
conversion period. On the same line, Oude et al. (2002) observe that it takes time to reach the optimal nutrient stock of soil 
and optimal nutrient supply for arable crops under organic farming. This extends the effective conversion period during 
which productivity slows down to 6-7 years. Kassie et al. (2008) find, on the contrary, a clear superiority of organic farming 
practices over chemical fertilizers in enhancing crop productivity for resource-constrained farmers cultivating land in a 
semi-arid Ethiopian area. 
6   Green Net statutory goal is “to serve as a marketing channel for small-scale organic farmers with fair trade 
principles in its marketing activities”, and, in particular, to: i) promote organic way of life through marketing and producing 
high quality organic and natural products (organic fairtrade rice; organic vegetables and baby corn organic coconut silk 
and cotton); ii) conduct trade with fair price for producers and buyers; iii) have responsibility for consumers and 
environment; iv) Support producers to organize as community enterprise to produce high quality organic and natural 
products and safe for consumers and environment; v) transfer knowledge organization’s research and development to 
general public; vi) campaign for environment and fair trade; vii) support employees’ creativity and make them feel as an 
important part of organization; commit to generate organization growth with stability and continuity; viii) create added 
value for share-holders and appropriate returns; ix) be a model organization of “Social business” and encourage other 
business bodies to be more concerned with consumers safety, environment conservation and social responsibility.  6    
Green Net farmers produce organic
7 long grain red, white and brown Jasmine rice. The trading chain is 
organized as follows. Farmers sell the paddy rice
8 to a “producers’ group”, i.e. a local cooperative 
having 5-9 members representative of farmers; the price and the grading of the paddy rice is agreed 
upon by the Organic Fair Trade Rice Committee, which is composed of 2 members from 5 producers’ 
groups 2 members of Green Net Coop and 2 members of Earth Net Foundation. 
Green Net provides advance payments to the producer groups. The latter buy the paddy and stock it, 
while Green Net receives export orders for the whole year and gives instructions to the group on the 
quantity of rice to deliver; the milled rice is then delivered to Green Net for packaging. Green Net pays 
the producer group and exports and/or sells the rice locally. 
In addition, organic farmers receive the following two benefits from Green Net: i) in accordance with 
FLO laws, a Fair Trade premium to be used for different social and capacity building activities for 
organic farmers (i.e., scholarships, emergency funds, credit facilities, training, etc.); ii) an additional 
yearly Fair Trade bonus (1,280 bath per ton, last year) for organic production (see Table 1 for the 
premium incorporating price breakdown in 2008). 
Conventional farmers can be members of a producers’ group and thus benefit from group trading 
(higher market power and information on market demand with respect to individual uninformed 
producers), while not enjoying the two above mentioned Fair Trade benefits.   
                                                 
7   The organic production method followed by Green Net farmers is organised as follows. Cropping pattern begins in 
May after the first rainfall. Farmers plough the land to get rid of the weed. Weed residues are incorporated into the soil and 
the fields are left for the residues to be decomposed. After the decomposition, a second plowing is done in order to loosen 
the topsoil and to flatten the field in order to regulate the water level. Rice seedlings are transplanted into the field around 
June-August. Rice takes around 3-4 months to mature. The grain is left to dry in the field before harvesting (ranging from 
end of November to December). Few farming activities occur after this period since water is not abundant during dry 
season. In areas where irrigation exists, farmers may plant legume crops (e.g. peanut or sward been) or cash crops (e.g. 
melon) in the rice fields. Also, some may cultivate vegetable crops during the winter season (around December-January) as 
there are few pests on vegetables during this period. Rice is cultivated once a year and thus little pest infestation problems 
occur.  
8   Paddy rice is the individual rice kernels that are in their natural, unprocessed state. It is harvested directly from rice 
fields or rice paddies and transported to a processing site. As part of the processing, the protective hull is removed, leaving 
only the actual rice kernel for consumption.   7    
To evaluate the impact of Green Net affiliation
9 we look at affiliated farmers in two organisations from  
two different areas of the Yasothorn province: the Bak Rua Farmer Organization (BRFO) and the 
Nature Care Society (NCS). 
  The Bak Rua Farmer Organization (BRFO) is situated in Ban Don Phueng village (Moo 4) of 
Tambol Bak Rua, Mahachanachai District, Yasothorn province. It is located 10 km from 
Mahachanachai district and 35 Km from Yasothorn and roughly 530 kilometres from Bangkok. BRFO 
has members spreading in 45 villages of 25 tambol (all in Yasothorn province)
10. 
BRFO
11 started in 1976 by the government agency to help the (chemical) fertilizer distribution scheme 
of the government. Soon after it, it was temporary suspended due to the failure in collecting payments 
from members. It was re-established again in 1981, trying to continue with the fertilizer distribution 
scheme. In 1987, it started collective buying and selling of rice paddy, and, later on, it became 
specialized in rice mill. A small rice mill was built in 1989 servicing farmers in the village to mill rice 
for self consumption. In 1994 BRFO received funding support from the government to construct a 
commercial mill. A local non-governmental organization started working there in 1996 to help 
supporting farmers to reduce the use of agro-chemicals in rice farming. In 1999, the groups started 
collaborating with Green Net. 
                                                 
9   Green Net  is therefore a second level cooperative providing services to first level local  associations such as the 
Bak Rua Farmer Organisation and the Nature Care Society. The second level is required for coordinating production 
between local cooperatives, developing research and promotion of organic agriculture and providing export services on a 
larger scale. All members of first level associations are also members of Green Net. 
10   Bak Rua is predominantly a rice cultivating area. Farmers grow sticky rice (Kor Ko 6) for family consumption and 
grow Hom Mali rice as cash crop. As the soil consists of sand and no irrigation system are available, farmers only cultivate 
one rice crop a year without any other supplement crops. Farmers rely on natural rain for rice farming. Unpredictable 
rainfalls in recent years affected rice yields quite significantly. 
11   The BRFO is registered as “Farmer Organization” under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative 
since 8 April 1976 (Farmer Organization has a legal status equivalent to Farmer Cooperative) with the following goals: i) 
support members to grow rice without using chemical inputs and establish rice farmlands appropriate to local ecology; ii) 
strengthen farmer organization so that it can manage and control rice quality throughout the chain;  iii) encourage learning 
among farmers so that they can manage rice mill as rural enterprises sustainably. 
  8    
BRFO started with 118 members in 1976 and reached 853 members in 2007. To become a member it is 
necessary to pay 20 bath as entrance fee and purchase a minimum of 1 shares (price = 10 bath/share) of 
BRFO. Members are allowed to buy 100-bath shares of the rice mill.  
The organisation started pesticide-free rice farming in 1996 with support from local NGOs 
complying with the following certification standards: i) ACT Organic Standards according to IFOAM 
Basic Standards (IFOAM programme); ii) EU Regulation 2092/91; iii) BioSwiss organic standards. 
BRFO is being receiving the FLO’s certification since 2002 as part of Green Net Cooperative. 
 
The second association under scrutiny is the Nature Care Society (NCS) and is situated in Ban Sok 
Kumpoon village (Moo 2) of Tambol Naso, Kudchum District, Yasothorn province. It is located 12 km 
from Kudchum district and 40 Km from Yasothorn and about 530 kilometres from Bangkok. Members 
are spread in 95 villages of 5 districts (all in Yasothorn province). 
 Since 1980, farmers in Naso village started working with the Herbal for Self-Reliance Project- HSRP 
(a local NGO which promotes the use of herbal medicines and traditional health care systems). In 1991, 
with the support of the HSRP, a rice mill was set up in the area to process natural rice. The Nature Care 
Society has no formal registration. Its mill is associated with “Naso Rice Farmer Organization”, a 
registered organization under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative (Farmer 
Organization has a legal status equivalent to Farmer Cooperative)
12.  
As far as membership is concerned, there are two types of members, i.e. farmers and non-farmers. New 
members must pay 20 TBT as entrance fee and can purchase a minimum of 50 shares (value at 
TBT/share). 
                                                 
12   Its objectives and goals are: i) to support members to grow rice without using chemical inputs; ii) to solve farmers’ 
problems of unfair price and trading in paddy; iii) to expand the milling capacity to economy of scale; iv) to strengthen 
farmer organizations; v) to provide learning process in running a community business. 
  9    
NCS started the organic rice farming in 1992 by itself. In 1996, a group of farmers first received 
organic certification. The certification standards followed are: i) ACT Organic Standards according to 
IFOAM Basic Standards (IFOAM programme); ii) EU Regulation 2092/91; iii) BioSwiss organic 
standards. 
NCS is being receiving the FLO’s certification since 2002 as part of Green Net Cooperative.  
 
3. The dataset  
 
During 2008 a questionnaire was delivered to 360 farmers living in the two districts,  Kud Chun and 
Bak Reua (Table 2). In each district, respondents were randomly chosen - in equal number - among 
affiliated (members of the Green Net cooperative) and non affiliated farmers. The treatment group was 
randomly generated from the list of all organic Green Net farmers in the two selected areas, while the 
control group has been randomly created from a list including all farmers living close to (within 10 
kilometers  from at least one of the selected) organic farmers. As it will be shown in descriptive 
statistics treatment and control samples exhibit no significant differences in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics.
13  
Cooperative membership is widespread in the area and not limited to Fair Trade affiliated. In Kud 
Chun and in Bak Reua 84 and 77 percent of farmers, respectively, are members of cooperatives. This 
implies that, while all affiliated farmers are obviously cooperative members, also 60 percent non 
affiliated members belong to cooperatives. Controlling for this will allow us to measure in the 
econometric evaluation of differences between treatment and control sample the specific effect of FT 
and/or organic certification on Green Net farmers rather than a generic cooperative effect.   
                                                 
13   Beyond attention to the sample design we will control ex post for the selection bias problem with the propensity 
score approach and by checking whether our findings are robust when we restrict the sample to affiliated producers only 
(see section 5).  10   
As to the kind of information collected, our questionnaire contains 75 questions concerning various 
measures of qualitative and quantitative well-being.
14 In particular, in addition to traditional socio-
economic variables, the questionnaire reports information on income and various measures of wealth 
(land size, information on housing, sanitation and on durables owned), savings and productivity, child 
schooling and farmer education, working activity and working conditions, price and trading 
information, human and social capital indicators, self-esteem and happiness. Table 3 provides summary 
statistics of the main variables and Table 4 summarizes basic information on the two samples.  
 
4. Descriptive Findings 
 
To increase clarity of exposition we divide the analysis of descriptive findings in subsections dealing 
with specific issues. 
 
4.1 Socio-demographic variables, cooperative membership and  affiliation years 
Treatment and control samples do not present significant differences in terms of socio-demographic 
characteristics (Table 4). Respondents’ average age is 50 years with affiliated farmers being slightly 
younger (49) than non affiliated (51). The average number of school years in the overall sample is 6, 
with a slight but not significant difference (7 versus 6 years) between affiliated and non affiliated 
farmers. Family sizes are not significantly different when we consider either the number of people 
living in the respondent’s family or the number of the respondent’s children.  
Median certification years in the treatment sample are seven. Average certification years are sligthly 
higher in Kud Chun (4 years) than in Bak Reua (3 years) and the difference is significant (at 95 
percent). 14 farmers in our sample (7 in each area) are “in conversion”, i.e. they are in the first year of 
                                                 
14   The questionnaire is omitted for reasons of space and available from the authors upon request.  11   
the procedure to obtain organic certification
15. Notice that Fair Trade affiliation is more recent than 
organic certification, as Green Net cooperative received FLO certification in 2002. 
 
 
4.2 Price and sale conditions 
 
Respondents were asked to specify the share of Jasmine rice production sold to cooperatives and to 
other buyers as well as the price received per ton. It results that, on average, the price paid by local 
cooperatives per ton is significantly higher than the price paid by other buyers (10,902 vs 10,459 baht) 
and, in turn, the Fair Trade price (13,941 baht) is significantly higher than the price paid by local 
cooperatives. Interestingly, affiliated farmers obtain better conditions than control famers also when 
selling to local cooperatives (11,305 against 10,019 baht). Such difference may depend on differences 
in bargaining power or may be the organic premium recognised by the local market. The gap in the 
average price paid by local cooperatives also differs on geographical grounds, being higher in Kud 
Chun (11,533 vs 10,260 baht per ton), while there is no geographical difference for the price paid by 
other buyers. Advance payments do not make a strong difference since only 8 farmers, all affiliated to 
Fair Trade, received advance payments from local cooperatives, while none of the respondents received 
advance payments from other buyers. 
On average, profits and dividends received by affiliated farmers are as much as 3 times higher than the 
amount received by non affiliated (303 vs 101 baht).  
 
4.3 Productivity, income, wages and investment 
                                                 
15   Conversion farmers are excluded from the sample used for econometric estimates since the conversion process 
implies a momentary break in production.  12   
Treatment and control samples are not significantly different at 95 percent (even though they are at 90 
percent) in terms of productivity calculated as income from agriculture per hour worked. Yet, the 
creation of economic value (per capita income from agriculture)  is significantly different.  
Farmers’ average income raised from agriculture is around 51,321 baht per year, average income is 
39,656 in Kud Chun  while 59,598 in  Bak Reua. Affiliated farmers’ average income is significantly 
higher than non affiliated farmers’, both overall (60,942 against 41,646 baht) and in the two different 
areas. The difference in income between affiliated and non affiliated farmers finds correspondence in a 
similar difference in income from agriculture per hour worked (126 against 98 baht), even though 
standard deviation is large and significance is much weaker. Note also that, across areas, there is a 
remarkable difference in average productivity  (around 173 vs 26 baht per hour in Bak Reua with 
respect to Kud Chun).
16  
Almost half farmers have a second activity (craftmanwork, construction and other sectors). Considering 
the sum of income raised from the first and second activity, the two main previously mentioned results 
are confirmed, as income from the two activities in Bak Reua is higher (75,726.9 baht per year) than in 
Kud Chun (54,722.15 baht per year), and still higher for affiliated  (78,778.61 baht per year) than for 
non affiliated farmers (55,173.74 baht per year). In both cases, the difference is significant at 5 percent.  
The same occurs if we take into account total family income, i.e. the sum of the respondents’ and of the 
family members’ income. Farmers in Bak Reua are still richer (106,655.3 baht per year) than in Kud 
Chun (81,026.17 baht per year)
 17 and affiliated farmers are still richer (104,897.3 baht per year) than 
non affiliated farmers (87,089.39 baht per year). Consistently with a family structure which is not 
                                                 
16   Such difference is due to a difference in the quality of lands in the two areas. 
17   If we evaluate it at the average exchange rate in  the month of the survey (1 U.S. dollar = 34.17 Thai bath) we 
obtain the value of 2.18 dollars per day per household member in Bak Reua against 1.65 in Kud Chun. If we consider the 
2005 PPP of 16 bath per dollar we get respectively 6.17 against 4.69 dollar per day. 
     13   
significantly different between treatment and control samples, per capita income (total, from first and 
from second activity) is always significantly higher in treatment than control sample. 
Although total land size is higher for affiliated than for non affiliated farmers (26 vs 24 rai)
18, the 
difference is not significant, nor it is so in the two subsample areas. 
Total productivity (income from first and second activity per hour worked) is around one third higher 
for affiliated with respect to the control sample (93.749 against 67.43 baht). This is the result of three 
different components: i) affiliated farmers have a one fifth higher productivity in agriculture than the 
control sample, even though the standard deviation is high and the difference is not significant at 90 
percent; ii) affiliated farmers are twice more productive than control farmers in the second activity; iii) 
the second activity is by far less productive than the main one and control producers employ 15 percent 
more hours than affiliated producers in this activity. The combination of facts ii) and iii) is such that, 
even devoting less hours to the second activity, affiliated farmers have a slightly larger income from 
that than control ones. 
Some farmers employ temporary workers for their activity. Affiliated farmers employ on average more 
temporary workers than non affiliated (3.8 vs. 2.5) and farmers from Bak Reua hire almost 3 times 
more temporary workers than respondents in Kud Chun. In both cases the difference is significant at 5 
percent. However, there are no significant differences in the employee wage between the two groups. 
During last year, respondents’ investment in working activity amounted to 9,958 baht. Affiliated 
farmers’ average investment expenditure is markedly higher than non affiliated (14,651 vs. 5,265 baht), 
although variability is very high and this difference is not significant at 5 percent; capital investment is 
higher in Bak Reua as compared to investment in Kud Chun (10,400 vs 9,339 baht), but also in this 
case the difference is not significant. 
 
                                                 
18   Thai unit measure corresponding to a 40*40 meter area.  14   
4.4 Consumption expenditure  and self-consumption  
Total family food expenditure amounts to 446 baht per week in the sample. Non affiliated farmers 
spend more than affiliated (461.5 vs. 430.7 baht), although the difference is not significant. Farmers’ 
families in Bak Reua spend significantly more than in Kud Chun (552.9 versus 296.6 baht). An 
invisible, though important component of productivity and creation of economic value, is self 
consumption. As it can be easily imagined, 100 percent of the rice consumed in (both treatment and 
control) farmers’ households is self produced and not bought on the market. Beyond rice, organic FT 
certified producers do not buy 81 percent of vegetables consumed against 71 percent in the case of  
control producers. The gap is 79 against 68 percent for papaya, 54 against 40 for fresh fruit in general, 
53 against 49 for chicken and 70 against 57 for fish (almost all farmers have ponds with fishes in their 
land plots). 
This implies that the observed positive differences in income from agriculture between affiliated and 
non affiliated farmers are downward biased with respect to the true ones which should include the 
value of self consumption. We therefore sum the visible and the invisible income by evaluating the 
income from the self consumed share at the local market value. The total value of self-consumption for 
affiliated farmers is higher than the control sample, the difference being 29,503 vs. 24,217 baht per 
year.
19 As a consequence, the difference in income from agriculture between affiliated and non 
affiliated farmers is higher when self consumption is considered, and around 6,239 versus 5,032 baht 
(when we do not include selfconsumption) per capita per year. 
 
4.5 Savings, debt and wealth  
                                                 
19If we sum the visible to the invisible (self produced)  food consumption, we find that the consumption share over total 
family income goes from 22 to 50 percent for affiliated (29 to 56 percent for non affiliated) farmers when we add to the 
former the market value of self consumption. Self consumption adds 27 percent (31 percent) to total family income in Bak 
Reua (Kud Chun). By taking it into account standard of living rises from 6.17 to 7.87 (4.69 to 6.14) dollars per day in PPP 
in Bak Reua  (Kud Chun).   15   
 
Affiliated farmers appear to be relatively better off in terms of financial conditions: their savings share 
is around 15.5 of total income against 11.15 for control farmers, while total family debt to income ratio 
is slightly higher in the control than in the treatment sample (1.2 vs 1). 
Summing up the number of durables owned,
20 it results that, on average, that there is a slight, although 
significant, difference between affiliated and non affiliated farmers (around 8 vs. 7). 
Wealth can also be measured by other indirect indicators (directly observed by researchers and 
therefore not subject to measurement bias), such as those related to housing accommodation.  In this 
respect, all respondents (except one) use electricity as light source and as fuel for cooking in their 
house. Furthermore, 54 percent of affiliated farmers have their house made of timbers, while 44 percent 
have a house made of brick or concrete. Less than 10 percent have bareground floor in their house, with 
a very similar proportion between treatment and control sample; 20 percent of respondents have wood 
floor, 33 percent tiles floor and 37 percent cement floor, with the proportion between affiliated and not 
affiliated being similar. 51 percent households have an exclusive bathroom outside their house, with a 
non significant difference between non affiliated and affiliated farmers, while around 48 percent 
families  have exclusive bathroom inside their house. 
 
5. Econometric findings on the organic certification effect 
 
Descriptive findings highlight a significant difference in the creation of economic value between the 
treatment and control group (section 4.3). We check whether our finding is confirmed when controlling 
for factors affecting the creation of value. 
                                                 
20  Our dataset has also information concerning some durable goods owned by the respondents, which are: tv, 
entertainment devices (CD, DVD players, etc,), fridge, bicycle, motorcycle, car, water pump, plowing machine, gas stove, 
truck and mobile phone.   16   
Our controls include education, geographical location, age, sex, marital status, number of children, 
years of working experience, number of temporary employees, affiliation to a local cooperative and 
land size. The significance of the agricultural income per capita gap between treatment and control 
farmers is supported in our first specification where the marginal effect of one year of organic 
certification amounts to around 818 baht, which approximately corresponds to 2 percent of the current 
average income from agriculture in the control group (Table 5, column 1). The only other two variables 
which matter are geographical area and land size.
21  
The organic certification result persists when we control for the size of the FT premium (the magnitude 
falls to 632 baht) (Table 5, column 2). The the FT premium size is definitely a component of the 
current difference in agricultural income between control and affiliated farmers (this is why we include 
it in our estimates), but it cannot explain the marginal effect of the treatment (i.e. why any additional 
year of organic certification contributes significantly to such a difference in income). The premium 
may have helped farmers to save more and to reduce their debt to income ratio across years (see 
descriptive findings in Table 4), but it can generate a positive effect of affiliation years on income only 
if it is invested (together with higher savings) in capacity building. The likely interpretation of the 
positive effect of certification when controlling for the FT premium is therefore that a combination of 
productivity and commercialization gains progressively widened the income gap across years. The 
hypothesis that the effect is the same in the two areas is rejected since certification years have a 
stronger impact in Bak Reua area (Table 5, columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with the significantly 
higher income and productivity of this area. 
 
5.1 How to tackle endogeneity and selection bias 
 
                                                 
21   The hypothesis of a quadratic relationship between land size and our dependent variable has been tested and 
rejected. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.  17   
The relationship between affiliation years and creation of economic value is not free from endogeneity. 
To tackle the problem we try to select a good set of exogenous instruments. We identify them into the 
farmer’s distance from the cooperative affiliated to Fair Trade and the number of exogenous 
memorable events
22 with positive or negative economic consequences as declared by farmers. The 
distance is correlated with affiliation since it is a component of the cost of bringing the product to the 
cooperative and of any other activity which requires face to face meetings at the cooperative. To check 
for the exogeneity of this instrument we verify that sample farmers are “locked” in their geographical 
location and did not change it after starting their agricultural activity. With regard to exogenous 
memorable events, we identify the following with positive economic consequences among those 
reported by farmers: i) an increase in the paddy rice market price, ii) a positive shock on production, iii) 
a present from farmers’ sons and daughters (money or, in same cases, a car), v) a wage shock in the 
second activity, vi) lottery winning and vii) the granting of awards. We classify as exogenous 
memorable events with negative economic consequences: i) close relative’s death, ii) disease, iii) car 
accidents, iv) fire, v) car breaking, vi) an increase in the input market price, vii) the death of animals 
used as capital investment (such as water buffalos), viii) a slow development of the soil. In both cases 
(positive and negative events) we only consider events which took place from 1995 on. In the estimate 
shown in column 5 (Table 5) certification years are instrumented only by farmers’ distance from the 
cooperative, while exogenous events are introduced as additional instruments in column 6. 
While we can exclude that our set of instruments suffers from the problem of reverse causation we 
need to test their exogeneity with proper diagnostics. To this purpose we use the standard approach of 
verifying whether the residual (from a “modified specification” in which instruments replace selected 
endogenous regressors) has significant effects when introduced in the standard non instrumented 
                                                 
22   Even cross-sectional surveys are based on memory efforts of  respondents when asking basic information such as 
last year income. Survey data maintains the same reliability if we extend memories back in the past for important events in 
life. For  a discussion on the validity of using retrospective information based on memorable events see McIntosh et al. 
(2007).   18   
equation. As it is well known, instruments are exogenous if the null of insignificance of the added 
variable (residual from the “modified specification”) in the standard non instrumented equation is not 
rejected. To see whether this is true we compute Wooldridge's (1995) heteroskedasticity-robust score 
and regression tests which show that the null hypothesis of exogeneity is not rejected (if we consider 
the 99 percent confidence interval) when we use only the distance from the cooperative as instrument 
(Table 5, column 5). The Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null in the 
specification in which we use more than one instrument (Table 5, column 6) but the null of exogeneity 
is rejected. 
Results on the base estimate obtained with the above mentioned instruments for the certification age 
variable show that the latter is positive but significant only at 10 percent (Table 5, columns 5 and 6). 
We will compare later these weak results with the much better ones in specifications in which we 
replace organic with FT affiliation years and include in income the invisible part of self consumption. 
The wider problem of heterogeneity between treatment and control sample requires further testing 
before we can rely on our results. In the impossibility of running a randomized experiment it is always 
possible that the observed difference in performance variables between treatment and control sample 
does not depend on the treatment but on the ex ante different characteristics which affected the decision 
to affiliate (implicit selection) or on explicit admission rules discriminating entrance (explicit 
selection).   
We use two additional checks to control for selection bias. First, we compare treatment and control 
producers with a propensity score approach. When estimating the propensity score we carefully avoid 
to include variables which have positive impact on income per capita (included variables are age, 
number of children, gender and geographical location).  In a second specification we add school years 
and job experience (also not significant as determinants of income from agriculture per capita).  In both  19   
cases the difference between treatment and control sample is significant and strong (between 4,200 and 
4,500  baht) (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
Since also propensity score matching has limits when used on variables in levels and not in first 
differences, an ultimate remedy against heterogeneity between treatment and control producers is that 
of estimating the effect of affiliation years in the subsample of affiliated producers only.
23 This is an 
option not available in impact studies in which there is no graduation of the treatment, but available to 
us since years of affiliation differentiate producers in terms of exposition to the program. 
When we restrict our estimate to affiliated producers only the affiliation effect is much weaker (t-stat 
around 1.55) and its magnitude falls to 545  baht (Table 7, column 1). When we calculate the effect 
separately in the two areas we find 5 percent significance in the Bak Reua, while no significance in the 
Kud Chun area (Table 7, column 2). 
 
5.2 Econometric findings on the FT affiliation effect 
 
As clearly shown when describing the Green Net project, organic certification anticipates affiliation to 
FT which starts only from 2002. We therefore re-estimate specifications presented in Tables 5-7 by 
replacing years of organic certification with those of FT affiliation. This corresponds to rescaling the 
previous variables by introducing an upper bound of 6 years for all farmers with organic certification 
longer than 6 years.  
Empirical findings from this new specification show that FT affiliation years are significant and 
stronger in magnitude (Tables 8-9). 
                                                 
23   We carefully verified the absence of survivorship bias among members in Green Net. Exits are around 1 percent in 
the last 10 years and not caused by worsening economic conditions.  20   
In the base estimate the magnitude of the effect is larger than the organic certification effect (1,350 baht 
per year) and moves to 1,458 when we introduce the FT premium (Table 8, columns 1-2).
24 It is 
significant when calculated separately in the two areas (Table 8, columns 3-4) and remains so in the 
instrumental variable estimate (Table 8, columns 5-6).  Exogeneity tests are slightly better than in the 
organic year estimate. The single instrument equation does not reject the null of exogeneity at more 
than 5 percent and the multiple instrumented equation at 1 percent. 
When we restrict the sample to affiliated farmers the one-year effect magnitude gets stronger and 
remains significant after correcting for the 2008 FT premium (Table 9, columns 1-2), differently from 
what happens when measuring the organic certification effect. (Table 7, columns 1-2).  
The FT and organic certification years are obviously highly correlated (.92). However, it is possible to 
test directly whether one of the two effects prevails on the other in two ways i) by estimating the base 
and the restricted model with both variables and ii) by using a Davidson-McKinnon (1993) test. The 
test clearly shows that the FT affiliation effect is stronger. The predicted dependent variable from the 
FT affiliation estimate is significant at 5 percent in the organic certification estimate (Table 10, column 
2), while it is not so for the opposite case.  
 
5.3 Robustness check: adding the “invisible” income from self consumption 
 
We repeat all estimates presented in Tables 4-6 by adding the market value of agricultural products 
produced and consumed in the household. The value is calculated on the basis of the market prices 
measured at the time of our inquiry.
25 Results are substantially similar and the significant effect of 
affiliation is confirmed under the different specifications and methodological approaches (Table 11). 
                                                 
24   The latter corresponds to around 3.5 percent of the current average income from agriculture in the control sample. 
25   The maintained assumption is that farmers would not alternatively have problems to sell the self consumed part on 
the market.  21   
From a quantitative point of view the impact of one year of organic certification and Fair Trade 
affiliation are, respectively, about 200/300 baht larger than when measuring income from agriculture 
without the self production component (see model 1 findings in Table 11). The result is confirmed 
when testing separately the effects in the two areas and when instrumenting them with farmer’s 
distance from the cooperative. The important point here is that exogeneity tests perform quite better 
than in previous estimates. In the model with FT years the null of no endogeneity is not rejected at 10 
percent level in the single instrumented specification (see column 4).
26 
The Davidson-McKinnon (1993) test confirms the superiority of the specification with FT affiliation 
versus that with organic certification years even when the invisible (self consumed) part of agricultural 
production is consumed. 
 
6. Interpretation of our findings 
 
To sum up, our findings document that FT affiliation affects creation of economic value more than 
organic certification years. Part of it may be due to the double bonus of FT (a price premium directly 
granted to farmers and a premium granted to the organisation to be invested for innovation and the 
provision of local public goods). Part of it may also depend on marketing gains generated by FT. To 
this point consider that affiliated producers sell a significantly higher share of their Jasmine rice 
production (83 against 72 percent of control sample producers) with no significant differences in family 
size and in the share of self consumed rice (100 percent for both). 
We also observe that affiliated farmers earn significantly more as shareholders (have significantly 
higher dividends from the cooperative) and have relatively higher shares of self consumption which 
                                                 
26   The magnitude of the effect of one FT affiliation year in the single instrumented model is the largest in all 
estimates and corresponds to around 13 percent of the current average income from agriculture in the control sample. 
  22   
represent the invisible side of the economic value created by farmers. All these benefits are associated 
to better financial conditions (higher savings share and lower debt to income ratios). 
Note that, if we repeat estimates discussed in section 5 using total productivity or income from 
agriculture per worked hours, we do not find a significant effect of organic farming or FT affiliation 
years.
27  
The interesting question raised by our findings is therefore why affiliation years increase creation of 
economic value and production yield without increasing productivity per worked hours.  
As it is well known economic growth may come from higher productivity or from an increase in 
worked hours. We fall here into the second case since affiliated workers have not significantly different 
hours worked per day vis-à-vis control workers but work 20 days more per year on average in 
agriculture (151 against 131).  In addition to it, hours worked increase with affiliation years. Farmers 
below the median affiliation year work on average 1,461 hours per year against 1,723 hours for those 
above the median. 
In the light of the two different branches of the empirical literature on FT and organic farming effects 
we are led to conclude what follows. Organic farming confirms itself as a practice of increasing labour 
intensity. The overall balance in terms of productivity and creation of economic value is not 
unfavourable for organic farmers. This is a substantial finding if we take into account past results in the 
literature (see introduction and footnote 5) and the productivity slowdown of the post-conversion 
learning period. Consider as well that the potential environmental and health effects of organic farming 
are not under scrutiny in this paper. As a consequence, our conclusions cannot be considered a 
comprehensive evaluation of the  impact of such initiative including all dimensions of individual and 
environmental wellbeing..   
                                                 
27   Estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.  23   
When investigating in depth the contribution of each affiliation year we discover that the contribution 
of  FT affiliation years is decisive. 
This leads us to conclude that the additional FT characteristics which are not included in organic 
production (improved market access through the provision of an alternative trade channel, introduction 
of a premium to be invested in capacity building and in farmer’s welfare) should play a decisive role in 




One of the main Fair Trade’s declared goals is capacity building and promotion of inclusion of 
marginalised farmers via social benefits and easier access to international markets. When this 
declaration is believed by concerned consumers willing to pay for the social value incorporated in the 
product, it increases the intangible value of FT goods.  
For this reason it is of foremost importance to investigate whether FT affiliation actually affects 
producer’s capacity of creating economic value.  
We investigate the issue on a sample of Thai organic rice producers working for the Green Net 
cooperative. The trade agreement between FT importers and the cooperative clearly states that 
importers must pay a premium which has to be employed for various social and productivity 
purposes.
28  
                                                 
28   More specifically, Table 1 shows that, in the Bak Reua case, it can be used for  - i) green manure seed, ii) farmer 
training and iii) member welfare, e.g. education of their children, natural disaster relief to improve its management, while, 
in the Kude Chun case, 50 percent is allocated to the mill to improve its management, 25 percent is allocated to the 
extension work and 25 percent is allocated for Organic Fair-Trade Fund. This Fund has also contribution from other sources 
and provides loans to members who wish to convert to sustainable production as well as other community benefits.  24   
In this paper we test whether what is stated on the above mentioned agreement translates into an 
effective process of capacity building. Our findings lead us to identify a clear link between the 
“duration of the treatment” (years of membership) and creation of economic value.  
Econometric findings show that any additional affiliation year has a positive and significant effect on 
income from agriculture of affiliated producers. This effect does not translate into significantly higher 
productivity since affiliated workers tend to work progressively more hours. Only when considering FT 
(and not organic) affiliation years, our findings are robust under three alternative approaches 
controlling for endogeneity and selection bias: i) instrumental variable estimation; ii) propensity score 
evaluation and iii) restriction of the estimate to affiliated producers only. These results continue to hold 
when the invisible part of self consumed income is accounted for. 
Finally, our research sheds light on two relatively less explored sides of the relative performance of FT. 
We find that affiliated farmers sell a significantly higher share of their Jasmine rice production and 
have a significantly higher share of self consumption than non affiliated farmers on almost all products 
which are part of their diet. This implies that part of the affiliation effect is due to improved market 
access and that the observed income from agriculture and productivity effect is downward biased. 
Given the relative dominance of the FT affiliation over the organic farming effect, the concurring FT 
affiliation is probably crucial in determining a nonnegative productivity and per capita income 
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Table 1: Breakdown of price and FT benefits determination in 2008 for Green Net affiliated 
farmers in  Bak Reua and Kud Chun 
  Bak Reua  Kud Chun 
October 2007 - organic farmers 
discuss about the price of the paddy 
and set it around... 
THB 10,000 
January 2008 – Conventional farmers 
receive from the market the same price 
as organic farmers (THB 10,000). 
Organic farmers receive a bonus for 
organic production  of … 
+ THB 2,500 
Additionally, the FT premium that goes 
only to producer’s group is for 2008 
(according to FLO law …) 
+ THB 750 
The FT bonus (also called paddy fund) 
that goes directly to organic farmers 
is… 
+ THB 1,280 
Further FT benefits  Local training, extension activities, advising and support to organic farmers 
Local cooperative’s dividend (to 
organic and conventional members). 
Variable (positive) computed as 
follows: 
8% of the capital share farmers 
invested in the cooperative  
+ THB 50 per ton of paddy sold. 
Variable 
(0 in the last years) 
Fair-trade premium utilization 
 
The premium is divided into several 
funds to which farmer members can 
apply for support 
(a) green manure seed 
(b) farmer training 
(c) member welfare, e.g. education of 
their children, natural disaster relief 
(a) 50% is allocated to the mill to 
improve its management  
(b) 25% is allocated to the extension 
works 
(c) 25% is allocated for Organic Fair-
Trade Fund. This Fund has also 
contribution from other sources and 
provides loans to members who wish to 
convert to sustainable production as 
well as other community benefits. 
Local cooperative’s funds (to organic 
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Table 2. Summary information on the samples 
   THE “TREATMENT” GROUP AND  THE “CONTROL GROUP  
 IN THE WHOLE AREA 
Number of Observations  360 
N. of Organic Farmers  180 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers  180 
N. of Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  288 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers out of Cooperative/producer's group  72 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  108 
N. of Farmers in conversion  14 
BAK REUA 
Number of Observations  210 
N. of Organic Farmers  105 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers  105 
N. of Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  162 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers out of Cooperative/producer's group  48 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  57 
N. of Farmers in conversion  7 
KUD CHUM 
Number of Observations  150 
N. of Organic Farmers  75 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers  75 
N. of Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  126 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers out of Cooperative/producer's group  24 
N. of Non-Organic Farmers in Cooperative/producer's group  51 
N. of Farmers in conversion  7 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables 
Variables Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Income from agriculture  51321.31  38556.56  500  260000 
Total income  67009.05  53837.59  500  390000 
Family income  96018.16  91109.73  5000  790000 
Self consumption (market value)  26859.58  16961.19  0  74977.32 
Age 50.21111  11.90444  23  79 
School years  6.258333      3.055191  3           19 
People in the household  3.797222      1.581753                    0  9 
Number of children  2.519444      1.382203                    0  9 
Temporary employees  3.186111       5.46667            0  37 
Employee daily wage  155.1613  34.83458  120  500 
Number of durables owned  7.916667      1.529196    2  11 
Household food consumption expenditure  446.1333  312.7669  20  3000 
Investment in input  9958.611  61240.91  0       800000 
Local (non Green Net) cooperative price  10901.86                    1198.29  8000  12500 
FT price  13940.98      732.7797          10000      15780 
Other buyers price  10459.53  2798.526  6000        21000 
Cooperatives advance payments  .0311284      .1740036            0            1 
Green Net dividends  243.9961      509.4296            0         4000 
Other coop dividends  39.28926  172.4658  0  1500 
Total  productivity  80.70326  100.8628     .4761905     666.6667 
Productivity of the  1
st working activity  112.2625      162.5647     .4761905         2000 
Productivity of the 2
nd  working activity  37.90209  60.98353  .375     476.1905 
Debt/income   1.143719  1.986836  0  20 
Saving/income (share)  13.51667  16.15629  0  90 
Land size (rai*)  24.96806 14.1498 3  100 
Variable legend: see Appendix. 
*Thai unit measure corresponding to a 40*40 meter area. 
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Table 4. Confidence intervals of selected variables for FT producers and the control sample 
  Ft producers  Non Ft producers 
Variables   Obs.   Mean   [95%  Conf. Interv.]  Obs.   Mean   [95%  Conf. Interv.] 
Socio-demographic  features           
Ft years  180  5.283333*      5.078092   5.488574  180      0  
Certification years  180  6.888889*      6.431667     7.34611  180      0  
Age  180  49.1  47.41761    50.78239  180  51.32222  49.51545      53.129 
School years  180      6.611111*      6.132579    7.089643  180  5.905556*      5.49255    6.318561 
People in the household  180      3.827778      3.613573    4.041983  180      3.766667  3.516413     4.01692 
Number of children  180  2.488889      2.302008    2.675769  180  2.55      2.331082    2.768918 
           
Income, productivity and investment          
Income from agriculture   180  60942.49*  55225.46  66659.53  179  41646.37*  36363.51   46929.22 
Total income   180  78778.61*  70469.44    87087.77  179      55173.74*  48040.08    62307.41 
Family income   180  104897.3
  92479.45    117315.2  179      87089.39  72814.02    101364.8 
Temporary employees   180      3.822222*    2.914331    4.730113  180      2.55*  1.87567     3.22433 
Employee daily wage   86        156.2791  147.1056    165.4525  69        153.7681  148.6373     158.899 
Land size   180    26.08056  24.17416    27.98695  180  23.85556  21.61981     26.0913 
Total productivity  180  93.74913*  77.02672    110.4715  177  67.43628*  54.95465    79.91791 
Productivity of the 1
st working activity   180  125.8913      104.4428    147.3399  177      98.40271  72.09847    124.7069 
Productivity of the 2
nd working activity  92  49.01387*  32.77152    65.25622  85  25.87522*  19.59875    32.15169 
Investment in input  180      14651.67  2960.193    26343.14  180      5265.556  258.4469    10272.66 
Price, sales and trading conditions           
Local (non Green Net) cooperative  price  177  11305.73*  11141.69    11469.76  81        10019.32*  9824.894    10213.75 
FT price  177      13940.98  13832.28    14049.68      
Other buyers price  4          11583.25  4267.535    18898.96  116      10420.78  9916.863    10924.69 
Cooperatives advance payments  176      .0454545     .0143782    .0765309  176  0   
Green Net dividends  177  306.0904 *    219.1588     393.022  77  101.2597*  56.44248     146.077 
Other cooperative dividends   6  14  -7.197561    35.19756  115  40.6087  7.949534    73.26786 
Food expenditure and self-consumption         
Household weekly food expenditure  180      430.7111  381.1277    480.2945  180      461.5556  419.4204    503.6907 
Rice self-consumption share  180  100  100         100  180  100  100         100 
Noodles self-consumption share  170  .2941176  -.2865001    .8747354  167  1.197605  -.4693058    2.864515 
Vegetables self-consumption share  180  81.33333*  77.6292    85.03747  180  71.30556*  66.74405    75.86706 
Papaya self-consumption share  180  79.35*  74.34501    84.35499  179  67.7933*  61.65727    73.92932 
Fresh fruit self-consumption share  180  53.96111*  48.87574    59.04649  180  39.55556*  34.51099    44.60012 
Eggs self-consumption share  180  25.98889*  19.91602    32.06176  179      16.98324*  11.77462    22.19186 
Milk self-consumption share  170  3.582353  .7799004    6.384805  170  2.411765  .1084575    4.715072 
Chicken self-consumption share  178  52.86517  45.86483    59.86551  179  49.27374  42.44436    56.10313 
Other meat self-consumption share  177  0    177  .0564972  -.0550019    .1679963 
Fish self-consumption share  180  70.38889*  65.07485    75.70292  179  57.15084*  51.09267      63.209 
Fresh noodles self-consumption share  172      .5813953      -.5662407    1.729031  175  .5714286  -.5563951    1.699252 
Market value of self consumption   180  29502.66*  27029.26    31976.06  180  24216.51*  21754.81    26678.21 
Savings, debt and wealth           
Debt/income   180  1.040396  .7944135    1.286379  179  1.24762  .9143597     1.58088 
Saving/income (percent)  180  15.56389*  12.96199    18.16578  180  11.46944*      9.378305    13.56058 
Number of durables owned  180      8.333333 *     8.144836    8.521831  180      7.5*  7.258395    7.741605 
* 5 percent significance of the difference in means between affiliated and non affiliated farmers.   30   
Table 5: The effect of organic certification years on per capita household income from agriculture (thousand bath) 
   
OLS  
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS)  
 
 
Dependent variable: per capita household  income  from agriculture)  (Instrumented variable: organic 
certification years) 
  Equation 1     Equation 2    Equation 3    Equation 4    Equation 5    Equation 6   
Control group  2.096261  2.515116  2.164635  2.049935     37.95238  33.50922    
  (1.437)  (1.749)  (1.482)  (1.398)     (1.529)         (1.716)    
Area1  -7.468254**   -5.624645**      
  (-5.525)   (-3.745)      
Area2   6.452535**    5.643593**  15.4101*  14.44963** 
    (4.352)    (3.750)     (2.532)    (2.925)    
Age                .0994526  .098599  .0793663  .0765185     -.2454686  -.2032293    
  (1.418)  (1.418)  (1.138)  (1.083)     (-.923)  (-.895)    
Number of children  -.514838  -.5370602  -.5437539  -.5415752     -.3806767  -.409844    
  (-1.109) (-1.150) (-1.173) (-1.165)      (-.509)  (-.583)       
School years  -.2519862  -.252277  -.263609  -.2653176     -.5391375         -.5047439    
  (-1.209) (-1.213) (-1.301) (-1.317)        (-1.106) (-1.147)       
Male  .1340217  .0667066  .1416808  .1629953     .5365545  .3859259    
  (.1074) (.0537) (.115)  (.130)        (.229)  (.177)       
Married  .7986077  .8862895  1.370711  1.432871     5.222724  4.823583    
  (.300)  (.331)  (.496)  (.5127)     (.798)    (.792)  
Divorced  .0812717  -.2199668  .4995221  .6542248     8.785472  7.856937    
  (.0228)  (-.0621)  (.139)  (.180)     (.857)          (.851)    
Years in agriculture  .0627544  .0627157  .0669684  .067631     .1410976    .1332476    
  (1.126)  (1.131)  (1.175)  (1.173)     (.925)  (.952)    
Certification years  .8185072**  .6316182**    6.110847          5.462464    
  (4.640) 2.859    (1.718) (1.942)       
Certification years 1    .5778565**  .5965702**      
    (2.990)  (2.789)        
Certification years 2    1.136404**  1.241406*        
    (3.971)  (1.975)          
Temporary employees  .0085186  -.0010207  -.0205889  -.0222329     -.1400134  -.1207512    
  (.0687)  (-.008)  (-.166)  (-.1784)     (-.669)          (-.661)    
Land size  .3483096** .3482052** .3536237** .3544759** .2959587** .3024255** 
  (6.942)  (6.974)  (7.045)  (6.986)     (3.517)          (3.725)    
FT  premium    .0007708    -.0002305        
   (1.428)    (-.235)        
Constant  1.267371  -5.998363  .7549146  -4.724651     -32.55138         -29.40346    
  (.281)  (-1.298)  (.165)  (-1.083)     (-1.589)         (-1.765)    
N of obs.  358  358  358  358     294     294    
P- value (overall 
goodness of fit) 
3.94e-16  7.19e-16  1.14e-17  1.56e-19     4.09e-07  4.56e-08    
Tests of instrument 
esogeneity  
      
Robust score 








Test of overidentifying restrictions       
Score 
2  (2)       .421199   
(p=0.8101) 
Legend: coefficients and t-stats; ** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. All estimates are with heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. 
Instrumented variable: certification years. Instruments: distance from cooperative (equation 5); distance from cooperative, positive 
exogenous events, negative exogenous events (see section 5.1 for a list)  (equation 6). 
Tests of endogeneity: Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test and a robust regression-based test 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: Sargan's (1958) and Basmann's (1960) 
2  tests. Variable legend: see Appendix.  31   
Table 6.1 The effect of FT affiliation on per capita household income from agriculture 
(propensity score estimate) 
Propensity Score Estimate – Probit Regressions 
(Dependent Variable: Affiliation dummy) 
  Model 1   Model 2  
  Coefficient z-stat  Coefficient z-stat 
Area 1  -.0186111 (-0.14)  -.0396236 (-0.29) 
Age  -.0159115 (-2.34)  -.0055874 (-0.57) 
Number of 
children 
.046204 (0.82)  .0369817  (0.65) 
Male  .2868614 (2.04)  .2355149 (1.61) 
School years    .030153  (1.14) 
Married    .4176686  (1.27) 
Years in 
agriculture 
  -.0055407  (-0.75) 
Constant  .5564597 (1.84)  -.2894752  (-0.50) 
  Number of obs.  360  Number of obs.   360 
 LR  
2 (4)  7.61  LR 
2 (7)  11.03 
 Prob  >  
2  0.1069  Prob > 
2  0.1375 
 Pseudo  R
2  0.0152  Pseudo R
2  0.0221 
 Log  likelihood  -245.72776  Log likelihood  -244.02013 
 
Table 6.2 The effect of FT affiliation on per capita household income from agriculture 
(propensity score matching) 
Propensity Score Matching 
(Dependent variable: Per capita income from 
agriculture) 
  n. treat.  n. contr.  ATT  t-stat 
Model 1  180 180 4506.621  (3.573) 
Model 2  180 180 4293.024  (2.836) 
Note: ATT is the average treatment of the treated. Regressors in the ATT estimate are dummy for FT affiliated producers, 
Land size, [Land size]
2 for model 1 with the addition of temporary employees in model 2.  The balancing property is 
satisfied. Standard errors with bootstrapping and 50 replications. 
Variable legend: see Appendix. 
 
  32   
Table 7: The effect of organic certification years on per capita household income from 
agriculture (sample restricted to affiliated producers) (thousand bath) 
OLS  
 
Dependent variable: per capita household  income  from agriculture 
 
    Equation 1     Equation 2   
        
Age   .2160537       .1289239     
   (1.911)       (1.011)     
Number of children   -.3890588       -.2904015     
   (-.467)       (-.350)     
School years   -.2361534       -.2338186     
   (-.739)       (-.778)     
Male   -3.323648       -2.700016     
   (-1.662)       (-1.317)     
Married   9.296444**    10.3843** 
   (2.804)    (2.876) 
Divorced   7.478083    10.26233     
   (1.267)    (1.651)     
Years in agriculture   .0210991    .0502066     
   (.2197)    (.474) 
Certification years   .5450243     
   (1.548)     
Temporary employees   -.021389    -.0619727 
   (-.115)    (-.342) 
Land size   .3758203**    .3849802** 
   (3.990)    (4.189) 
Certification years 1       -.0447008     
       (-.1208)     
Certification years 2        1.558604*     
       (2.247)     
Ft premium   .0032576**    -.0011436 
   (3.268)       (-.531)     
Constant   -20.35118*    -8.500757     
   (-2.381)    (-1.0732) 
        
N of obs.    172    172    
P-value (overall goodness of fit)    .0000771            .0000876    
Legend: coefficients and t-stats; **: 1 percent significance, *: 5 percent significance. All estimates are with heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
Regressors are from the affiliated sample. 
Variable legend: see Appendix.  33   
 Table 8: The effect of FT affiliation years on per capita household income from agriculture (thousand Bath) 
 OLS    Instrumental  variable  (2SLS)   
 
Dependent variable: per capita household  income  from agriculture  Instrumented variable: FT  affiliation years 
  Equation 1     Equation 2    Equation 3    Equation 4    Equation 5    Equation 6   
          
Control group  3.14652*  3.152634*  3.04989*  2.695405     26.38337  23.33963 
  (2.199) (2.198)  (2.0939)  (1.835)     (1.743)  (1.947) 
Area 1  -7.18528** -7.483749**         
  (-5.527) (-5.044)         
Area 2   6.524948**  6.683946** 9.308472**  9.012142** 
   (4.264)  (4.357)      (4.061)  (4.338) 
Age  .1047793  .1051203  .1001419  .0836077     -.0434554  -.0237628 
  (1.537)  (1.542)  (1.489)  (1.231)     (-.329)  (-.210) 
Number of children  -.4809568  -.4715545  -.4934683  -.4527717     -.294628  -.330878 
  (-1.027) (-.997)  (-1.048) (-.958)        (-.505)  (-.594) 
School years  -.2233816  -.2219019  -.2288768  -.2376519     -.1870135  -.1898228 
  (-1.077) (-1.070)  (-1.108) (-1.164)        (-.747)  (-.780) 
Male  .2973841  .3272789  .2990336  .6067799     1.385653  1.157801 
  (.240) (.265)  (.242) (.477)        (.791)  (.682) 
Married  .3406913  .2611039  .5721248  .7680207     2.684802  2.561886 
  (.128) (.098)  (.211) (.279)        (.624)  (.610) 
Divorced  -.2505796  -.1933862  -.1094202  1.073429     4.373648  3.937838 
  (-.074) (-.057)  (-.032) (.311)       (.711)  (.674) 
Years in agriculture  .0596335  .0593849  .0604057  .0612299     .0943945  .0916546    
  (1.115)  (1.112)  (1.126)  (1.132)     (1.197)  (1.210) 
Ft years  1.350382** 1.45805**      5.80117*  5.218551* 
  (5.586)  (3.619)      (2.050)  (2.312)    
Temporary employees  .0135053  .0162447  .0058999  .00071     .0056845  .0092844    
  (.1079) (.130)  (.047)  (.006)        (.041)  (.068) 
Land size  .3441327** .3436279**  .346097**  .3494768**  .3133825**  .3177537** 
  (6.990) (6.951)  (6.942) (7.018)     (5.255)  (5.289) 
Ft premium   -.0002308   -.0023215*         
   (-.327)   (-1.99)           
Ft years 1     1.20334**  1.653129**     
     (3.594)  (4.159)         
Ft years 2     1.450869**  2.966236**       
      (4.544)  (3.269)        
Constant  .1245096  .2846922  -6.588748  -5.947474     -27.64499  -25.15812*   
  (.028) (.062)  (-1.466)  (-1.334)        (-1.899)  (-2.036) 
N of obs.  358  358  358  358     294  294 
P-value (overall  
goodness of fit) 
6.03e-18  3.53e-18  1.35e-19  1.90e-20     2.57e-13             1.45e-13 
Tests of endogeneity          
Robust score 
2 (1)          3.3048  (p=0.0691)  4.61158  (p=0.0318) 
Robust regression F(1,280)        3.04876  (p=0.0819)  3.07467  (p=0.0806) 
Test of overidentifying restrictions         
Score 
2 (2)            1.63952  (p=0.4405) 
Legend: coefficients and t-stats; ** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. All estimates are with heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. 
Instrumented variable: FT years. Instruments: distance from cooperative (equation 5); distance from cooperative, positive exogenous 
events, negative exogenous events (see section 5.1 for a list) (equation 6). 
Tests of endogeneity: Wooldridge’s (1995) robust score test and a robust regression-based test. 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: Sargan's (1958) and Basmann's (1960) 
2 tests. Variable legend: see Appendix.  34   
 Table 9: The effect of FT affiliation years on per capita household income from agriculture 
(sample restricted to affiliated farmers) (thousand bath) 
OLS  
 
Dependent variable: per capita household  income  from agriculture  
 
       Equation 1        Equation 2  
Age   .1893868       .1532398     
   (1.729)       (1.351)     
Number of children   -.2694462       -.2489142     
   (-.3140)       (-.289)     
School years   -.226613       -.2306541     
   (-.725)       (-.742)     
Male   -2.336937    -2.189811     
   (-1.113)       (-1.037)     
Married   9.608373**    9.573048** 
   (3.129)    (3.145)     
Divorced   9.856791    10.61492 
   (1.790)    (1.941) 
Years in agriculture   .0155602    .0411891 
   (.169)    (.437) 
Ft years   2.254683*       
   (2.501)     
Temporary employees   -.0185474       -.0225136     
   (-.102)    (-.124) 
Land size   .3825852**    .3813571** 
   (4.157)    (4.192) 
Ft premium   .003305**      -.0059342 
   (3.518)      (-1.034) 
Ft years 1       -1.110434 
       (-.484) 
Ft years 2       2.934869** 
       (2.942) 
Constant   -28.82804**    3.345025     
   (-2.838)    (.159) 
N of obs.    172    172    
P-value (overall goodness of fit)    .0000238            .0000197    
Legend: coefficients and t-stats; ** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. All estimates are with heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
Variable legend: see Appendix. 
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Table 10: organic certification versus FT affiliation years (Davidson McKinnon Test) 
Davidson McKinnon Test 
OLS Estimates with RSE 
Dependent variable: per capita household  income  from agriculture (thousands of bath) 
   Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
    (Predicted Var.: FT 
affiliation years) 
(Predicted Var.: organic 
certification years) 
Area 1  -7.260584**      
  (-5.342)      
Area 2    6.169198 .9224076     
    (1.815) (.264)     
Control group  3.141594*    2.835254 .366031     
  (2.194)    (1.675)    (.203)   
Age  .1033073    .0887737 .010881     
  (1.508)  (1.046)    (.136)   
Number of children  -.4848361    -.4095994 -.0605814     
  (-1.036)    (-.766)    (-.120)   
School years    -.2289626    -.1921382    -.0319164   
  (-1.110) (-.799)      (-.145)   
Male  .2699465 .2503611  .0076223     
  (.218) (.202)  (.006)     
Married  .3528454 .2361395  .0523198     
  (.132)    (.088) (.0196)     
Divorced  -.2277618 -.2396386      -.006724   
  (-.066) (-.0699)  (-.002)     
Years in agriculture  .0599731 .0508024  .0073701     
  (1.114) (.839)  (.123)     
Ft years  1.19118* 1.19118*   
  (2.136) (2.136)   
Certification years  .1196139    .1196141   
  (.306)    (.306)   
Temporary employees  .0116371 .0103923  -.0002759     
  (.093) (.0832)  (-.002)     
Land size  .3441203** .2932195  .0405589     
  (6.966) (1.714)  (.267)     
y  (organic certification years)
1    .1461367   
    (.306)   
y  (FT affiliation years)
 2     .8821057*   
     (2.136)   
Constant  .2786064 -6.075801  -.7536317     
  (.062) (-1.147)      (-.137)   
       
N. of obs.  358  358  358    
p-value (overall goodness of fit)  7.54e-18  7.54e-18  7.54e-18    
1. Predicted dependent variable from model in column 3 when excluding  y  (FT affiliation years) from the estimate  
2. Predicted dependent variable from model in column 2 when excluding  y  (FT certification years) from the estimate  
Legend: coefficients and t-stats; ** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. All estimates are with heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
Variable legend: see Appendix.  36   
 
Table 11: The effect of Certification years and FT years on per capita income when 






years (area 1)  
Organic 
Certification 




years (area 1) 
FT affiliation 
years (area 2) 
Dependent variable: Per capita income from agriculture and selfconsumption 
OLS model # 1  1.049704**     1.695782**     
  (5.491)             (6.493)     
OLS model # 2  .8585559**     1.927427**         
  (3.512)            (4.395)     
OLS model # 3    .7812269**       1.40436**    1.598068**  1.762559** 
   (3.551)  (4.703)    (4.333)  (5.167) 
OLS model # 4   .8159783**  1.599349*        2.144011**  3.601877** 
    (3.409)     (2.483)       (4.938)     (3.718)    
OLS model # 5  .7757561*     3.00966**     
  (2.092)     (3.187)         
OLS model # 6    .0407064     2.03911**    .4576734     3.525489** 
    (.0987)     (2.895)    (.179)    (3.318)     
Davidson-Mc 
Kinnon test 
.2498924         1.363184*     
 (.584)      (2.248)     
2 SLS model # 1  5.737092     5.446356         
  (1.633)              (1.858)             
Test of endogeneity           
Robust score 
2 (1)  3.18177  
(p=0.0745) 







  1.9495   
(p=0.1637) 
  
            
2 SLS model # 2  4.848505         4.506378*       
  (1.810)         (1.969)        
Test of endogeneity           
Robust score 
2 (1)  3.96816  
(p=0.0464) 
  2.09992   
(p=0.1473) 
  










         
  Score 
2 (2)  .910245  
(p=0.6344) 
  2.24067   
(p=0.3262) 
  
OLS Model # 1: Table 5 column 1 and Table 8 column 1 
OLS Model # 2: Table 5 column 2 and Table 8 column 2 
OLS Model # 3: Table 5 column 3 and Table 8 column 3 
OLS Model # 4: Table 5 column 4 and Table 8 column 4 
OLS Model # 5: Table 7 column 1 and Table 9 column 1 
OLS Model # 6: Table 7 column 2 and Table 9 column 2 
2 SLS model # 1: Table 5 column 5 and Table 8 column 5 
2 SLS model # 2: Table 5 column 6 and Table 8 column 6 
** 1 percent significance, * 5 percent significance. 
 Appendix. Variable legend  
 
Variables Description  Variables Description 
 Area 1   Variable taking value of 1 if respondents 
live in Kud Chun  
Employee daily wage  Temporary employees’ daily wage 
Area 2  Variable taking value of 1 if respondents 
live in Bak Reua 
 Investment in input  Investment in input during last year 
Affiliation dummy  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are affiliated to FT and 0 
otherwise 
 Male  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are male 
 Age  Respondents’ Age   Married  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are married 
Control group   Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are members of cooperatives 
buy are not FT affiliated 
 Divorced  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are divorced 
 School years  Years of school attendance   Unmarried  Dummy taking the value of 1 if 
respondents are unmarried 
 Number of children  Number of children   Certification years  Number of organic certification years 
 People in the household   Number of people living in the 
household 
Certification years 1  Certification years in area 1 (Kud Chun) 
 Family food consumption  Household’s food expenditure in a week  Certification years 2  Certification years in area 1 (Bak Reua) 
 Rice  % of rice self-produced  FT years  Number of FT affiliation years 
 Noodles  % of noodles self-produced  FT years 1  FT years in area 1 (Kud Chun) 
 Vegetables  % of vegetables self-produced  FT years 2  FT years in area 1 (Bak Reua) 
 Papaya  % of papaya self-produced   Durables owned  Sum of durables owned by respondents 
 Fresh fruit  % of fresh fruit self-produced  Cooperatives price  Price of Jasmine rice paid by local 
cooperatives 
 Egg   % of eggs self-produced  FT price  Fair trade price for Jasmine price 
Milk  % of milk self-produced  Ft premium  Difference betweem FT price and the 
price payed by local cooperatives 
 Chicken  % of chicken self-produced  Other buyers price  Price of Jasmine rice paid by other 
buyers 
 Other meat  % of other meat self-produced  Cooperatives advance payments  Advance payment from local 
cooperatives (Jasmine rice) 
 Fish  % of fish self-produced  Cooperatives profit/dividends  Profit/dividend received from local 
cooperatives (Jasmine rice) 
 Fresh noodles  % of fresh noodles self-produced  Other buyers profit/dividends  Profit/dividend received from other 
buyers (Jasmine rice) 
Value of self consumption (per year)  Value of self-production (per year)  Total  productivity  Total income per hour worked 
 Years in agriculture  Working years in agriculture  Productivity 1
st activity  Respondents’ income  from agriculture 
per hour worked 
Income from agriculture  Respondents’ yearly income in 
agriculture 
Productivity 2
nd activity  Respondents’ income from second 
activity per hour worked 
Total income  Respondents’ yearly income from the 
main and the second activity 
Debt/income   Family debt to income ratio 
Family income  The sum of the yearly income earned by 
all members of the household 
Saving/income  Last year saving as a percentage of 
income 
Temporary employees   Number of the respondents’ temporary 
employees  
Land size  Total land size (rai) 
Positive exogenous events  Exogenous events having a positive 
impact on respondents’ income  
i) increase in the paddy rice market price, 
ii) a positive shock on production, iii) 
present from farmers’ sons and daughters 
(money or, in same cases, a car), v) wage 
shock in the second activity, vi) lottery 
winning and vii) granting of awards.) 
Negative exogenous events  Exogenous events having a negative  
impact on respondents’ income 
(i) close relatives’s death, ii) desease, iii) 
car accidents, iv) fire, v) car breaking, an 
vi) increase in the input market price, vii) 
the death of animals used as capital 
investment (such as water buffalos), viii) 
a slow development of the soil.) 
 
Distance from cooperatives  Distance from cooperatives4     
 Questionnaire 
N°  Question Alternatives                
1  Case number  CG or TG                  
2 Sex  female  [1]                 
   male  [3]                 
3 Age  number                 
4 Civil  status  Unmarried  [1]                 
   divorced  [3]                 
   married  [5]                 
5 
Are you member of a 
cooperative/producers' 
group? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
6 
If 5 = yes: How far do you 
live from the cooperative 
center (in Yasothon)? 
km                
7 
How many people in your 
household migrated in the 
last five years? 
number                
8  If 7 = yes: What for?  Relatives moved as 
well [1]                
   Schooling  [3]                 
   Marriage  [5]                 
   Look for work/start 
new job [7]                
   Famine, draught, 





              
9  if 7 = yes: Where?  Other village [1]                 
   Bangkok  [3]                 
   Other-Non-Bangkok 
[5] 
              
   Other-non-Thailand 
[7]                
10 
How much do you 
consider yourself happy 
(from 0 to 10)? 
0-10                
11  How many years have you 
attended the school?  years                
12 
How many children do 
you have? [fill the tab 
below] 
number                
13 Children  tab  Sex  Activity   




































  First                            
  Second                            
  Third                             
  Fourth                            
  Fifth                            
  Sixth                            
  Seventh                            
  Eighth                            
14  How far do you live from 
the school?  km                  
15 
During the last year your 
children went to school 
how much have you spent 
on education for?  
baht                 Fees                   
 Uniforms                   
 Textbooks                   
  Exercise books, pens, 
pencils                  
 Meals,  transportation                   
 Other  expenses                   
16  Where was your last child 
born?  at home [1]                 
    in a rural clinic [3]                 
    in the hospital [5]                 
    other (specify) [7]                 
17  Has your last child been 
vacccinated?  yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
18 
How much did you spend 
this year for dental care 
for the whole family? 
baht                
19  Has one of your children 
died? 
number of children 
died 
              
20 
Have you seriously 
injured yourself during 
the last year? 
how many times                 
21 
How many days have you 
got sick and could not go 
to work? 
days                
22 
If you were to sell your 
plot of land today, how 
much could you sell it 
for? 
baht/RAI               
23  Do you use any chemical 
fertilizer/pesticide?  yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
24 
If 23 = no: Did you use 
chemical 
ferilizer/pesticide in the 
past? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
25  if 24= yes: When did you 
stop using them?  year                
26 
How many people do 
usually live in your 
house? 
number                
27 
During the past year, how 
many times have you 
attended extension 
training activities? 
times [0 if not 
attended] 
              
28  If 27>0: What kind of 
training courses?   Use of fertilizers [1]                 
   Irrigation  [3]                 
   New seeds [5]                 
    Pest infestation [7]                 
   Blight  problems  [9]                 
   soil  problems  [11]                
   weather problems 
[13]                
   general crop advice 
[15]                
    marketing advice [17]               
   insemination services 
[19]                
   other (specify) 
_______ [21]                
29  If 27=0: Why?  I am not interested 
[1]                
    I don't have time [3]                 
    I can't afford them [5]               
   there aren't training 
courses [7]                                    
30 
Which is the main 
building material used for 
your house? 
timbers [1]                 
   bricks and concrete 
[3]                
   other  [5]                 
31  Which kind of floor is 
there in the house?  bare ground [1]                 
   cement  [3]                 
   wood  boards  [5]                 
   tiles  [7]                 
   other  [9]                 
32  Which is the main light 
source you have at home? electricity [1]                 
   gas  [3]                 
   oil  lamp  [5]                 
   candle  [7]                 
    other (specify) [9]                 
33 
What type of fuel does 
your family mainly use 
for cooking? 
wood [1]                 
   coal  [3]                 
   gas  [5]                 
   electricity  [7]                 





              
34  Has your family  access to 
drinkable water?  yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
35  Bathroom location and 
sharing: 
inside and exclusive 
[9]                
    inside and shared [7]                
   outside and exclusive 
[5] 
              
    outside and shared [3]               
    no bathroom [1]                 
36 
How much do usually you 
spend in food for all your 
family in a week? 
bath                









   





month [7]  never [9]  0 - 100 %     
  Rice             
  Noodles             
  Vegetables             
  Green Papaya             
  Fresh fruit             
  Eggs             
  Milk             
  Chicken             
  Other meat             
  Fish             
  Fresh noodles             
38 
How do you consider your 
standard of living 
compared to the one of 
other people who live in 
this village? 
much better [1]                 
   better [3]                    equal  [5]                 
   lower  [7]                 
   much  lower  [9]                 
39  Besides agriculture do 
you have another activity? craftwork [1]                 
   construction  [3]                 
   other (speficy)_____ 
[5]                






worked/day        
  Agricolture                       
  Second                       
41  How many employees do 
you have? 
Number of 
employees  Daily wage              
  stable employees                      
  temporary employees                     
42 
Are you usually involved 
in a labour exchange 
system? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
43 
Buyers Tab - Who do you 
usually sell Jasmine Rice 
to? 
Which share of 
production do you 
usually sell to each 


















How much are you satisfied with the 
price?   
     %  baht/ton  Yes [1] 
No [0]  baht  [1= very much 2= enough; 3= not very 
satisfied; 4= not at all]   
  Local cooperative                  
  Other buyers                  
44 
During last five years 
have you changed your 
production system? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
45  Please tell me the yearly 
income in your family.  baht                
 husband/wife                   
  sons/daughters                
 other  members                   
46 
Do you have other sources 
of non work income 
(subsidies, donations, etc.) 
? 
yes [1]                  
  from the community  no [0]                  
  from the state                   
  from private persons                   
  from development 
agencies/ngos                  
  remittances from relatives                 
 rents                   
 other  (specify)_____                   
47 
Which of the following 
things does your family 
own? 
yes [1]  no [0]                  
 tv                   
  entertainment devices 
(CD, DVD players, etc.)                  
 fridge                   
  bicycle                  
 motorcycle                   
 car                   
 water  pump                   
  plowing machine                   
 gas  stove                   
 truck                   
 mobile  phone                                       
48 
How much are you 
satisfied with your 
household’s living 
conditions?  
[0 - 10]                 
49 
How much do you 
consider yourself  a good 
farmer?  
[0 - 10]                 
50 
In your opinion, how 
much should your 
monthly wage be to live 
in a satisfactory way?  
baht                
51  What do you do with your 
production's wastes?  You burn it [1]                 
    You throw it [3]                 
   You re-use it as 
manure [5] 
              
   You  sell  [7]                 
   other (specify) 
_______ [9]                
52 
Have you ever 
asked/received loans in 









         
     Yes [1] No [0]  Yes [1] No 
[0]  %            
  friends                      
  relatives                      
  privates/neighbours                      
  producers' group/other 
buyers 
                    
  ngos                      
  bank                      
  financial institutions                      
  other (specify)_____                      
53  What is the total debt of 
your household?  baht                
54 
How much did you save 
approximately last year in 
percent of your earnings? 
%                
55 
How many of the 
following animals do you 
own? 
number                
 water  buffalos                   
 cows                   
  pigs                 
 fishes  and  frogs                   
 chickens                   
56 
How much did you spend 
for investment in your 
working activity 
(replacement of working 
tools, etc.) last year ? 
baht                
57  Do you know FAIR 
TRADE?   yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
58 
if yes, to with of the 
following statements do 
you agree the most? 
fair trade is charity 
[1]                
  
fair trade means 
getting a better 
earning [3] 
              
  
fair trade is an equal 
commercial 
relationship [5] 
                
fair trade is an 
alternative approach  
which is based on 
dialogue, 
transparency and 
respect trying for 
equity in international 
trade [7] 
              
59  Do you speak english?  yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
60 
Which groups or 
associations do you 
participate in or are you 
more interested in? 
yes [1]  no [0]                  
 sporting  groups                   
  religious groups or 
associations                  
 farmers'  cooperative                   
 local  community  groups                     
  cultural groups (music, 
dance)                  
  political parties                   
 other  (specify)_______                   
61 
Do you voted in the last 
election (at national or 
local level)? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
62 
Have you ever asked the 
other farmers to take care 
of your son? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
63 
Have you ever asked for 
help from the other 
farmers? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
64  Do you collaborate with 
your neighbours? 
yes [1]                  
   no  [0]                   
  ONLY FOR AFFLIATED 
FARMERS                  
65 
A 





              
     from relatives [3]                 
     other (specify)_____ 
[5]                
66 
A 
Was it easy to enter in  
GreenNet?  yes [1]                  
     no [0]                  
67 
A 
Which year did you 
receive the organic 
certification? 
year                
68 
A 
Have you ever exit from 
GreenNet?  yes [1]                  
     no [0]                  
69 
A 
How do you consider the 
sale conditions of 
GreenNet compared to the 
other buyers' ones? 
better [5]                 
     worse [1]                 




conventional producer, do 
you think: 
yes [1]  no [0]                  
    your field enjoy more 
birds?                  
    your soil keep the 
moisture longer?                  
    your field enjoy the                   presence of more small 
animals? 
  ONLY FOR NOT 
AFFLIATED FARMERS 
                
65 
NA 
Do you know any other 
farmer who works with 
any local cooperative? 
yes [1]                  
     no [0]                  
66 
NA 
If yes:Do you think they 
have better sale 
conditions? 
yes [1]                  
     no [0]                  
67 
NA 
Would you like to get the 
organic certification?   yes [1]                  
     no [0]                  
68 
NA 
If 67 = yes: What are the 
main contraints you find 
in doing that? 
costs [1]                 
     not enough sales [3]                 
     lower price [5]                 




              
69 
NA 
Since your organic 
neighbours have been 
working here, has your 
situation improved?  
improved [1]                 
     worsened [3]                 
     same [5]                 
 FOR  ALL                   
71 Events  Year           
                 
 
List a series of memorable economic events in 
the last years (i.e., purchase of machinaries; 
house renovation; marriage; famine; drought 
seasons; education decisions; etc.)                 
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
72  What is the total size of 
your land? 
Rai                
73 
What is the size of the 
plot where you grow 
jasmine rice? 
Rai                
74 
What was your total 
production of jasmine rice 
last year? 
tons                
 